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Abstract
We consider weak preference orderings over a set An of n alternatives. An individual
preference is of refinement f ≤ n if it first partitions An into f subsets of ‘tied’
alternatives, and then ranks these subsets within a linear ordering. When f < n,
preferences are coarse. It is shown that, if the refinement of preferences does not
exceed f, a super majority rule (within non-abstaining voters) with rate 1 − 1/f is
necessary and suﬃcient to rule out Condorcet cycles of any length. It is argued
moreover how the coarser the individual preferences, (1) the smaller the rate of
super majority necessary to rule out cycles ‘in probability’; (2) the more probable
the pairwise comparisons of alternatives, for any given super majority rule.
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1 Introduction
The aggregation of individual preferences through majority voting may yield Condorcet
cycles. The simplest example of such a cycle involves three collective choices 1, 2, and
3 and three agents whose individual preferences are respectively 1 1 2 1 3, 2 1 3 1 1
and 3 1 1 1 2. Pairwise comparisons of these alternatives under majority rule show that
there is always a two-third majority to prefer 1 to 2, 2 to 3, and 3 to 1.
Condorcet cycles are the main obstacle to the ability of majority voting to aggregate
individual preferences. Moreover, it is a simple exercise to construct preference profiles
in which some cycle appears. To what extent Condorcet cycles really jeopardize the ef-
ficiency of majority voting as a collective decision-making device is a question that has
been addressed from the early fifties with the pioneering work of Guilbaud (1952), who
computes the probability of the occurrence of such cycles when there are three alternatives
and a large number of voters. His work was followed by a line of others, among them:
Niemi and Weisberg (1968); DeMeyer and Plott (1970); Kelly (1974); Gehrlein and Fish-
burn (1976). They all tend show that, under the simple majority rule, the probability of
occurrence of Condorcet cycles converges to one when both the numbers of alternatives
and voters become large. All these results are obtained through the assumption of im-
partial culture, which states that voters draw at random their preferences in the set of all
possible orderings of the n alternatives, i.e., the group of all permutations of n elements,
Sn.
The oldest problem of the theory of Social Choice is to determine conditions under
which such cycles are ruled out. This question has been solved along two main lines.
The first one, initiated by Black (1958) through the concept of single-peakedness gives
suﬃcient conditions on individual preferences that rule out cycles. The family of spatial
voting models globally pertains to this line: Alternatives are taken on some underlying
continuous space (usually taken to be Euclidean); individual preferences over the set of
alternatives are ‘structured’ by classical assumptions (like continuity and convexity or
symmetry); and/or the profiles of individual preferences show some features which can be
given natural interpretations in terms of ‘consensus’ of the society; see, e.g., Plott (1967),
Kramer (1973), Grandmont (1978). This line usually suﬀers from restricted assumptions
on the ‘domain’ of such preferences: the set of allowed preferences is sometimes drastically
shrunk. The second strand of research focuses on super majority rules. It was shown that
for super majority rules of rates higher than 1− 1/q, there cannot exist cycles of length
smaller than q (Ferejohn and Grether, 1974). But, if alternatives are numerous, such an
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argument guarantees the aggregation process to be devoid of cycles only for the unanimity
rule, which is highly intractable: the acyclicity of the aggregated preference is obtained at
the expense of a lot of incompleteness in this collective preference. Caplin and Nalebuﬀ
(1988) yields a very beautiful result along both lines.
Balasko and Cre`s (1997, 1998) introduce, along these two lines, in a mostly discrete
setup, milder assumptions than usual (i.e., respectively, super majority rules with a low
rate and a domain restriction –based on some consensus of individual preferences– for
which a large ratio of all rankings are admissible) which rule out Condorcet cycles, if not
completely, at least with a high probability. The same simple framework is used in the
present paper. Let there be n alternatives. There are n! ways of ordering them: one
can identify the preference orderings with the permutations of the n alternatives. To
each preference σ is associated the percentage λσ of the voting population having this
particular individual preference. The vector (λσ)σ∈S (where S is the domain of individual
preferences; e.g. S = Sn, the whole symmetric group of cardinality n!, if there are no
restrictions) is then a point in the (2S − 1)-simplex; it represents a profile of individual
preferences, i.e., a particular distribution of voters among preferences. It appears that
for certain profiles, at least one Condorcet cycle obtains. Hence some regions give rise to
Condorcet cycles, and some others do not. The authors compute a brutal upper bound
of the relative Lebesgue measure of the regions in which cycles appear: these measures
are very small.
But one could argue that it is diﬃcult, even for a very clever and rational voter, to
completely order a large set of social alternatives. Reasons could be the diﬃculty of
gathering full information about the alternatives or the lack of time as well as the lack of
interest to compute this complete ranking. It makes sense to assume that people usually
have their subset of most preferred alternatives, their subset of least preferred alternatives
and some intermediate subsets, the number of which depends on the concern of the voter
about the poll, his ability to make up his mind in a limited amount of time about what is
at stake and which alternative is truly better. Hence it is not unreasonable to claim that
voters’ preferences, although transitive, may exhibit a lot of ties between the alternatives:
individual preferences are coarse. A tie between two alternatives is not meant to be a
real indiﬀerence. It only means that the voter finds it too costly either to figure out what
is his real preference between the two alternatives, or to express this preference through
voting: he is undecided. He then prefers to abstain from voting. A preference is said to be
of refinement f ≤ n when voters cannot distinguish, and then order, more than f groups
of alternatives. Hence, in the case of three alternatives, the only preference of refinement
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1 is the fully indecisive ranking: 1 ∼ 2 ∼ 3. It is of refinement 2, or dichotomous, if the
individual can distinguish only its most preferred alternatives and its least preferred ones;
in the case of three alternatives: 1 1 (2 ∼ 3); (2 ∼ 3) 1 1; 2 1 (1 ∼ 3); (1 ∼ 3) 1 2;
3 1 (1 ∼ 2) and (1 ∼ 2) 1 3.
There has been in recent years a strand of research supporting the idea that ties within
individual preferences makes their aggregation easier and surer: beyond the early work
of Inada (1964) and Fishburn and Gehrlein (1980), one can refer to Gehrlein (1997),
Gehrlein and Valognes (1998), Jones et alii (1995), Lepelley and Martin (1998), Saari
(1995), Tataru and Merlin (1997) and Van Deemen (1997).
It is shown in the present paper that, if the refinement of preferences does not exceed
f, a super majority rule with rate 1−1/f is necessary and suﬃcient to rule out Condorcet
cycles of any length, a generalization of Ferejohn and Grether (1974). Hence the key factor
to rule out cycles is not the number of alternatives, but the maximal degree of refinement
of the preferences expressed in the society. This is the object of Section 3. It is moreover
argued (in Section 4) how the coarser the individual preferences, the lower the rate of super
majority necessary to reduce to almost zero the relative size of the set of profiles for which
Condorcet cycles appear, hence their probability under various cultures. The drawback
of super majority rules is that it makes it rather improbable that pairwise comparisons of
alternatives be possible. It is shown that, for a fixed super majority rule, the probability
of a pairwise comparison between two alternatives increases toward 1 when the number of
preferences exhibiting a strong ranking between these two alternatives decreases. Hence
the coarser the individual preferences, the more likely pairwise comparisons, for a fixed
super majority rule.
2 The Setup
2.1 Individual Preferences
We consider a set of n political alternatives An = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Let us first define individ-
ual preferences over An. A fine individual preference is a complete strict and transitive
ranking over An, hence can be identified with a permutation of {1, 2, . . . , n}: to each
alternative is associated its rank in the individual preference; e.g., the permutation 231
of A3 stands for the individual preference 3 1 1 1 2.
A voter v associates a rank to each alternative in An. Weak preference orderings are
allowed: two diﬀerent alternatives can be given the same rank, which means that in the
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voter’s opinion, there is a tie between them. Hence an individual preference over the set of
alternatives can be conceptualized through the following two-stages process. A voter will
be said to have a preference of refinement f if it can first partition the set of alternatives
An into f subsets, and then rank the subsets within a linear ordering. His preference is
coarse to the extent that he might not exhibit a strong preference ordering between a pair
of alternatives taken in the same subset. But it is transitive:
i 1v or ∼v j
and
j 1v or ∼v k

 =⇒ i 1v or ∼v k ,
and at least one strict preference in the left-hand side of the assertion entails the strict
preference in the right-hand side.
To illustrate this point, take n = 7 and consider an individual having the following
preference: his first-best alternatives are {3, 5}, but he cannot make up his mind whether
alternative 3 is better or worse than alternative 5, and decides to stick to a tie; his
second-best choices consist in the subset of alternatives {1, 4, 7}, and finally his third-best
alternatives are {2, 6}; he ends up exhibiting the preference of refinement 3:
(3 ∼ 5) 1 (1 ∼ 4 ∼ 7) 1 (2 ∼ 6).
In this paper individual preferences will be represented as sequences (see below): the
preference (3 ∼ 5) 1 (1 ∼ 4 ∼ 7) 1 (2 ∼ 6) is identified to the sequence
2 3 1 2 1 3 2 ,
listing the ranks given to each alternative: alternative 3 and 5 are ranked first, therefore
the third and fifth element of the sequence is 1, etc. A preference is represented as a
sequence σ : σ(1) σ(2) . . . σ(n) . The integer σ(i) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , f} is the rank the voter
gives to alternative i.
Sequences
Take an integer f and let (e1, e2, · · · , ef) be strictly positive integers such that
e1 + e2 + · · ·+ ef = n .
Consider the sequences
σ : σ(1) σ(2) . . . σ(n) ,
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where for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, σ(i) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , f} and σ reaches the value m exactly em times,
1 ≤ m ≤ f. The sequence σ is said to be of refinement f and specification (e1, e2, . . . , ef)
(for technical points see Carlitz, 1972).
Let Sfn denote the set of sequences of refinement f and S≤fn =
m=f
m=1
Smn the set of
sequences of refinement at most f; Sn = S≤nn is the set of all sequences on An.
A sequence σ of refinement f is merely a surjective mapping from An into {1, . . . , f}.
Then the number of sequences of refinement exactly f on a set of n elements is the number
of such surjective mappings: it is well known that 2Sfn = l!Sn,f , where Sn,f the Stirling
number of the second kind at entry (n, f). Notice that sequences are also permutations
of the multiset
{1e1 , 2e2 , . . . , fef} = { 1, . . . , 1 , 1
e1 times
, 2, . . . , 2 , 1
e2 times
, . . . , f, . . . , f , 1
ef times
}.
2.2 The voting procedure
Let σ be a sequence of refinement f; denote S the domain of individual preferences (it is
the set Sn of all sequences if there is no domain restriction). Let mσ denote the number
of voters whose preference is σ. Then m =
3
σ∈S
mσ is the total number of voters and
λσ = mσ/m is the proportion of voters whose preference is σ. The parameter space
considered in this paper in the (bS − 1)—simplex (where bS = 2S, the cardinal of S) of
profiles:
∆S =
l
(λσ)σ∈S |
3
σ∈S
λσ = 1
M
.
Any profile of individual preferences can be represented by a point in ∆S . Conversely,
any point in ∆S can represent a profile of individual preferences provided the number
of agents is allowed to tend to infinity or even be infinite. This makes ∆S a suitable
parameter space.
Define the two following characteristic functions on the pairs (i, j) of alternatives,
i W= j:
χσ(i, j) =



1 if σ(i) < σ(j),
0 otherwise,
and
δσ(i, j) =



1 if σ(i) = σ(j),
0 otherwise.
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It is obviously the case that for all σ and pair (i, j), one has:
χσ(i, j) + χσ(j, i) + δσ(i, j) = 1.
When comparing the pair of alternatives (i, j) through the voting procedure, the pro-
portion of the voting population which prefers alternative i to alternative j, and then
votes for i against j, is
3
σ∈S
λσχσ(i, j).
Definition 1 Consider the super majority rule with rate τ , 0.5 ≤ τ < 1. Alternative i is
collectively preferred to alternative j (denoted i 1 j) for the super majority rule τ if and
only if
3
σ∈S
λσχσ(i, j) > µ
3
σ∈S
λσχσ(j, i),
where µ =
τ
1− τ .
Voters who tie i and j abstain from voting. Alternative i defeats alternative j if it rallies
a proportion higher than τ of the expressed votes. The simple majority rule, τ = 0.5
corresponds to µ = 1. The majority rule will be called indiﬀerently τ or µ, with τ = µ
1 + µ
.
Lemma 1 Alternative i defeats alternative j for the majority rule µ if and only if
3
σ∈S
λσ (1− χσ(i, j) + µχσ(j, i)) < 1 . (1)
Proof: Straightforwardly obtained from the inequality of definition 1 by adding the quan-
tity
3
σ∈S
λσ (1− χσ(i, j)) to both sides. 2
2.3 Cycles of alternatives
The voting procedure defines a binary relation (1) on the set of alternatives. A q-cycle
of alternatives, or cycle of length q, for the binary relation (1) is an ordered q-tuple
a = (a1, a2, . . . , aq) of the set An, that satisfy
a1 1 a2 1 . . . 1 aq 1 a1 .
A cycle of alternatives is clearly defined up to a circular permutation of the q-tuple.
Therefore, a cycle for (1) can be identified with an equivalence class of ordered sets, two
ordered sets being equivalent if one is obtained from the other by a circular permutation.
Inequality (1) is applied to get a necessary condition for the existence of cycles. Define
aq+1 = a1.
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Lemma 2 The inequality
3
σ∈S
λσζσ(a) < q , (2)
where
ζσ(a) = q −
q3
i=1
χσ(ai, ai+1)
 , 1
sσ(a)
+µ
q3
i=1
χσ(ai+1, ai)
 , 1
tσ(a)
,
is a necessary condition for the occurrence of the cycle a.
Proof: Obtained readily by adding the q inequalities (1) (one for each pair (ai, ai+1))
defining the cycle a. 2
Remark: The quantity sσ(a) measures how many of the q pairwise comparisons defining
the cycle a the sequence σ strongly agrees with. The quantity tσ(a) measures how many
times the sequence σ strongly disagrees with the cycle. Hence ζσ(a) can be interpreted as
a sort of distance of the preference σ to the cycle.
3 The
w
1− 1f
W
—super majority rule
It is shown in this section that, if the refinement of preferences does not exceed f, a super
majority rule with rate 1 − 1/f is necessary and suﬃcient to rule out Condorcet cycles
of any length (see Corollary 1 below). Hence the key factor to rule out cycles is not the
number of alternatives, but the maximal degree of refinement of the preferences expressed
in the society. This will be done by proving the following result.
Proposition 1 When the refinement of individual preferences does not exceed f, the super
majority rule with rate
1− 1
min (q, f)
is necessary and suﬃcient to rule out Condorcet cycles of length q.
This result is well known in the case where there are only fine individual preferences, in
which case f = n and min (q, f) = q (cf. Ferejohn and Grether, 1974). Two immediate
corollaries obtain.
Corollary 1 When the refinement of individual preferences does not exceed f, the super
majority rule with rate 1− 1/f is necessary and suﬃcient to rule out Condorcet cycles of
any length.
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Corollary 2 When the refinement of individual preferences does not exceed 2 (individual
preferences are dichotomous), there is no Condorcet cycles through the simple majority
rule.
This last corollary is identical to the result of aggregation obtained with approval voting
(Brams and Fishburn, 1983). The diﬀerence is that approval voting is a mechanism that
forces voters to express only dichotomous preferences.
Before proving Proposition 1, it is useful to introduce preliminary comments and nota-
tion. The strong properties of symmetry of the setup allows us, without loss of generality,
to the study to the cycle ι = (1, 2, . . . , q): only the length matters (see Balasko and Cre`s,
lemma 7). Let us introduce a useful concept. In the sequence σ(1) σ(2) . . . σ(n) , a pair
of consecutive elements (σ(i), σ(i+ 1)) is called
1. a rise if σ(i) < σ(i+ 1) (we denote it σ(i) ↑ σ(i+ 1)),
2. a fall if σ(i) > σ(i+ 1) (we denote it σ(i) ↓ σ(i+ 1)),
3. a level if σ(i) = σ(i+ 1) (we denote it σ(i)→ σ(i+ 1)).
If s, t, and u denote the number of rises, falls and levels in σ respectively, then s+ t+u =
n− 1, and the following obvious lemma holds.
Lemma 3 Let σ be a sequence of length n. Let s¯q, t¯q and u¯q denote respectively the
numbers of rises, falls and levels of the sequence of length q + 1:
σ¯ : σ(1) . . . σ(q)σ(1) .
Then s¯q + t¯q + u¯q = q and
tσ(ι) = t¯q and sσ(ι) = s¯q .
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider the case f < q; for the other case, cf. Balasko and Cre`s
(1997), lemma 13. To prove that the
w
1− 1f
W
-super majority rule is suﬃcient to rule out
Condorcet cycles, it is suﬃcient to show that any preference σ of refinement smaller or
equal to f satisfies: ζσ(ι) ≥ q when µ ≥ f− 1. Indeed, then
3
σ∈S
λσζσ(ι) ≥ q
3
σ∈S
λσ = q ,
an inequality that rules out the cycle ι as lemma 2 states.
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For µ ≥ f−1, one has ζσ(ι) ≥ (q− s¯q)+(f−1)t¯q. Let us first cope with the case where
u¯q = q, s¯q = t¯q = 0, which means that the preference σ is totally indecisive between the
alternatives {1, . . . , q}. Then ζσ(ι) = q and we are home. Otherwise, then s¯q and t¯q are
both bigger or equal to 1 (since, in the sequence σ¯, we depart from and arrive to σ(1), if
there is a rise, there must be a fall, and reciprocally). And a suﬃcient condition for the
property to hold is (q − s¯q) + (f− 1)t¯q ≥ q which is equivalent to proving that
s¯q
t¯q
≤ f− 1 .
Obviously, if this last inequality does not hold, the relative proportions of rises versus
falls is higher than f− 1, then one would have, along the loop
σ(1)
σ(q) σ(2)
· σ(3)
· ·
· ·
·
at least one series of f consecutive rises (ignoring levels); by consecutive is meant: unin-
terrupted by any fall. This would entail that the refinement of the preference σ is bigger
or equal to f+ 1, which cannot be. Hence the suﬃciency.
As far as necessity is concerned, the standard example of a profile composed with f
circular individual preferences la Condorcet immediately allows to conclude. 2
4 The probability of Condorcet cycles
This section provides rates of super majority ruling out Condorcet cycles ‘in probability’,
i.e., rates of super majority for which the relative volume, in the simplex ∆S , of pro-
files giving rise to Condorcet cycles is very small. A probabilistic interpretation of the
Lebesgue measure on the simplex of profiles can be constructed: it is the classical Impar-
tial Anonymous Culture (IAC) for an infinite number of agents; see Gehrlein (1997). In
this section, wherever an interpretation in probabilistic terms is given, this culture (or any
other resulting in a probability distribution that is absolutely continuous with respect to
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the Lebesgue measure) is implicitly assumed. It is argued that the coarser the individual
preferences, the lower the required rates.
4.1 An upper bound
Only an upper bound of these volumes will be provided here, and a very brutal one: it
is the volume of the set described by inequality1 (2). But yet an additional argument is
then given that reinforces the idea that the coarser the preferences, the easier and surer
it is to aggregate them through majority voting.
The key feature to measure the relative volume of the set of profiles (λσ) such that3
σ∈S
λσζσ(ι) < q is to rewrite this inequality by aggregating the weights λσ having the
same coeﬃcient ζσ(ι); the dimension of the simplex is thus reduced. To do that, let us
partition the set of individual preferences S by means of the characteristic function ζσ(ι),
into the subsets:
BS(r, t; q) = {σ ∈ S | ζσ(ι) = r + µt},
where (r, t) ∈ {q, 0} × {(r, t) | 1 ≤ t ≤ r ≤ q − 1}, therefore defining 1 + q(q − 1)
2
such
subsets. Hence the new simplex of aggregated weights is of dimension
q(q − 1)
2
, and is
endowed with this measure that is the projection of the Lebesgue measure on the original
simplex.
The leading example: n = 3. The only cycles are of length 3, so that q = 3 is omitted.
The domain S contains 13 individual preferences: the six fine preferences
(1) : 123 (2) : 132 (3) : 213 (4) : 231 (5) : 312 (6) : 321 ,
then six dichotomous:
(7) : 112 (8) : 121 (9) : 211 (10) : 221 (11) : 212 (12) : 122 ,
and the totally indecisive one, (13) : 111. The partition of S through the characteristic
function ζ gives four subsets:
BS(1, 1) = {(1), (4), (5)} BS(2, 2) = {(2), (3), (6)}
BS(2, 1) = {(7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12)} BS(3, 0) = {(13)}
.
1This inequality is obtained by addition of the q inequalities defining the cycle, therefore a lot of
information is lost in the process.
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Back to the general case, let bS(r, t; q) be the cardinal of BS(r, t; q); bS = r,t bS(r, t; q) be
the total number of individual preferences. Define finally b¯S(r, t; q) =
bS(r, t; q)
bS
.
Proposition 2 Fix the q-cycle ι = (1, . . . q). Define the continuous function FS(q;µ)
from N×R+ into R+:
FS(q;µ) =

r,t
X
r + µt
q
~b¯S(r,t;q)
.
The quantity X
1
FS(q, µ)
~bS
is an upper bound of the relative Lebesgue measure, in the (bS − 1)-simplex, of the set of
profiles giving rise to the cycle ι.
Proof: Standard argument reproduced from Balasko and Cre`s (1997), proposition (15).
2
FS(q;µ) is an increasing function of the rate µ and lim
µ→∞
FS(q;µ) = +∞ readily obtains.
Furthermore, FS(q; 0) ≤ 1 comes from r ≤ q. As soon as FS(q;µ) > 1, proposition 2
guarantees, for a big enough number of admissible preferences bS , the volume of ‘bad’
profiles to be very small (even when multiplied by the number of possible cycles).
Definition 2 The function FS(q; ·) is the characteristic function of the set of prefer-
ences S with respect to q-cycles, 3 ≤ q ≤ n. The (unique) positive real µS(q) such that
FS(q;µS(q)) = 1 is the critical rate of the set of preferences S with respect to q-cycles.
It is said critical because it is a threshold: for µ > µS(q), the probability of the cycle
ι is very small as soon as there are enough preferences in S. In the case of the leading
example (n = 3), the characteristic function is
FS(µ) =


w
1 + µ
3
W3 X2(1 + µ)
3
~3 w
2 + µ
3
W6


1
13
,
and the critical value is µ = 1.0718, corresponding to a super majority rule with rate
τ = 51.73%.
The sequel aims at showing that the coarser the individual preferences, the lower the
critical rate. Therefore, if individual preferences are coarse, one needs a lower rate of
super majority than for fine preferences to rule out cycles in probability.
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4.2 Computations of the critical rate of S
The present subsection is rather technical and can be skipped at first reading. It aims
at showing that the whole problem reduces to compute the critical rates, with respect to
q-cycles, of the set of preferences Sfq (of refinement f on q alternatives). The argument
goes through two steps:
1. by showing that one can study the behavior of the critical rate of S, µS , through the
behavior of the critical rates of any partition of S: this is done in lemma 4; and the
chosen partition is (Sfn)n whose critical rates with respect to q-cycles are denoted
(µfn(q))n;
2. then by showing that one can study the behavior the (µfn(q))n,q through the behavior
of the ‘diagonal’ critical rates µfq(q) (denoted µ
f
q): this is done in corollary 3.
The following lemma allows us to focus only on a well-chosen partition of S, namely
the subsets (Sfn)n of preferences of refinement exactly f.
Lemma 4 Consider two subsets of preferences S and S I, whose critical rates with respect
to q-cycles are µS(q) and µSI(q) respectively, with µS(q) ≤ µSI(q). Let µS∪SI(q) denote
the critical rate, with respect to q-cycles, of the set of preferences S ∪ S I. Then
µS(q) ≤ µS∪SI(q) ≤ µSI(q).
Proof: Let FS(q; ·), FSI(q; ·) and FS∪SI(q; ·) denote the characteristic functions, with re-
spect to q-cycles, of the set of preferences S, S I and S ∪ S I respectively. Then one has
FS∪SI(q;µ) = [FS(q;µ)]
bS
bS+bSI [FSI(q;µ)]
bSI
bS+bSI .
We have
FS∪SI(q;µS(q)) = [FSI(q;µS(q))]
bSI
bS+bSI
which is ≤ 1 because µS(q) ≤ µSI(q) and FSI(q; )˙ is strictly increasing. Symmetrically, we
have
FS∪SI(q;µSI(q)) = [FS∪SI(q;µSI(q))]
bS
bS+bSI
which is ≥ 1. Hence the result. 2
Let us now focus on the set of preferences Sfn of refinement exactly f, whose critical rate
with respect to is denoted µln(q). The corresponding partition through the function ζσ(ι)
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will be denoted (Bfn(r, t; q))r,t and the related coeﬃcient (bfn(r, t; q))r,t; the total number of
elements of Sfn is bfn. The following lemma and its corollary allow us to restrict the study
to the cycles of full length: n = q.
Lemma 5 We have:
bfn+1(r, t; q) = fbfn(r, t; q) + fbf−1n (r, t; q) .
Proof: The proof goes as in Balasko and Cre`s (1997), lemma 8. Adding the (n + 1)-th
alternative has no eﬀect on the property of a given individual preference σ with respect
the studied cycle ι, i.e., with respect to the value of sσ(ι) and tσ(ι). On the other hand,
an individual preference of Bfn(r, t; q) defines f preferences of Bfn+1(r, t; q), as many as
there are diﬀerent subsets of tied alternatives, and an individual preference of Bf−1n (r, t; q)
defines f preferences of Bfn+1(r, t; q), as many as there are places between (and at both
ends of) diﬀerent subsets of tied alternatives. 2
Corollary 3 The critical rate µfn+1(q) is contained between µ
f−1
n (q) and µ
f
n(q).
Proof: The proof goes exactly as in lemma (4) and exploits the preceding proposition. 2
Thanks to the results of this subsection, we know that we have all the required information
about the rates (µfn(q))f,n,q (e.g., whether the sequence (µ
f
n(q))f decreases with f) as soon
as we can compute the rates (µfq(q))f,q; denoted from now on (µ
f
q)f,q.
4.3 Results on critical rates
The only critical rate that are computed are µqq and µ
2
q, the rates of the sets Sqq of fine
and dichotomous individual preferences.
Proposition 3 The critical rate of the set of complete preferences Sqq with respect to
q-cycles is
µqq = V (q − 1)− 1 ,
where2 V (q) =
q + 1
1
?
q
1
#
q! 2
?
q
2
#
q! . . . q
?
q
q
#
q!
.
2The quantity
r
q
p
S
is the Eulerian number at entry (q, p).
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Proof: The preferences of Sqq are fine; therefore, for r W= t, b¯qq(r, t; q) = 0. Then the
characteristic function of Sqq becomes
F qq (q;µ) =
q−1
t=1
X
t(1 + µ)
q
~b¯qq(t,t;q)
=
(1 + µ)b¯
q
q(q)
q
q−1
t=1
tb¯
q
q(t,t;q),
where b¯qq(q) = 1, and b¯
q
q(t, t; q) =
r
q − 1
t
S
/(q− 1)! thanks to proposition (11) in Balasko
and Cre`s (1997). Then the characteristic function F qq (q; ·) can be rewritten
F qq (q;µ) =
1 + µ
V (q − 1);
hence the result. 2
Proposition 4 For all n ≥ q, the critical rate with respect to q-cycles of the set S2n of
preferences of refinement 2 is 1:
µ2n(q) = 1.
Proof. This is an immediate corollary of proposition 2. 2
The following table gives the values of µfq, and corresponding rate τ fq , for 3 ≤ q ≤ 6 and
3 ≤ f ≤ q.
q\l 2 3 4 5 6
3 1 (50) 1.1213 (52.8)
4 1 (50) 1.0529 (51.3) 1.0982 (52.3)
5 1 (50) 1.0327 (50.8) 1.056 (51.3) 1.076 (51.8)
6 1 (50) 1.0237 (50.6) 1.0395 (51) 1.0516 (51.2) 1.0618 (51.5)
These first values suggest the following conjecture.
Conjecture: For f ≤ q, µf−1q ≤ µfq
Hence the coarser the individual preferences, the lower the rate of super-majority necessary
to rule them out in probability. We can prove the conjecture for f = q.
Proposition 5 For all q s. t.3 V (q) <

1 +
2
q − 1 , then µ
q−1
q ≤ µqq.
Proof: See Appendix. 2
3This is a stronger property than the one obtained by Balasko and Cre`s (1997), theorem 16. This is
nevertheless checked on computers up to q = 1000, which is way above the highest values that are inter-
esting in the framework of this paper. These computations suggest that in fact V (q) can be approximated
by 2 + 1/(3q)− 5/(36q2).
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4.4 Probabilities of pairwise comparisons
The major weakness of the results provided in this section was raised by Tovey (1997): a
rate of super majority, along with ruling out cycles, makes it also highly improbable that
two alternatives can be compared. In fact, one should compare the probability of a cycle
with the probability of a pairwise comparison.
Here is provided the relative measure of the subset of parameters for which alternatives
i and j are comparable through simple majority voting, i.e., the probability that the
pairwise comparisons i 1 j or j 1 i occur. Define bi1jS =
3
σ∈S
χσ(i, j) (resp. bi∼jS =
3
σ∈S
δσ(i, j)), i.e. the number of preferences in S for which alternative i is better than
(resp. as good as) alternative j. Of course, for all (i, j),
bi1jS + b
i∼j
S + b
j1i
S = bS .
Proposition 6 The relative Lebesgue measure, in ∆S , of the subset of parameters for
which there is a pairwise comparison between i and j through simple majority voting is
2
X
1
µ+ 1
~bi1jS +bj1iS −1 bj1iS3
k=1

 b
i1j
S + b
j1i
S − 1
bj1iS − k

µb
j1i
S −k .
Proof: Following the principles exposed in Balasko and Cre`s (1997, 1998), the relative
volume of profiles for which i 1 j is:
(bS − 1)!
8 1
µ+1
t=0
tb
i∼j
S −1
(bi∼jS − 1)!
(1− t)bi1jS −1
(bi1jS − 1)!
dt .
It is the same for the profiles for which j 1 i, hence the coeﬃcient 2. 2
The important fact is that this probability does not depend on bi∼jS , the number of unde-
cided preferences on the pair (i, j). For values of µ close to 1 and small values of bi1jS +b
j1i
S ,
it remains non-trivial, whereas the probability of a cycle involving i and j is shown to be
very small when bi∼jS is big.
Example: Consider n = 3 and assume that dichotomous preferences are 9 times more
frequent than fine preferences (it amounts to assume the impartial anonymous culture
with an initial urn where dichotomous preferences are 9 times more likely to be chosen
than fine preferences); then the characteristic rate is τ = 50.4%, and for a super majority
rule with rate 53.5%, the upper bound gives 0.066 for the probability of a cycle (the actual
16
probability is certainly much smaller), whereas the probability of a pairwise comparison
is 0.65.
For a fixed super majority rule, the probability of a pairwise comparison between two
alternatives increases toward 1 when the number of preferences exhibiting a strong ranking
between these two alternatives decreases. Hence the coarser the individual preferences,
the more likely pairwise comparisons, for a fixed super majority rule.
5 Concluding comments
The paper gives several arguments tending to show how the coarser the individual pref-
erences, the surer it is that simple or super majority voting rules can aggregate them.
The approach chosen in Section 4 is probabilistic and based on the assumption of
impartial anonymous culture (i.e. the Lebesgue measure on the simplex of profiles). A
simple artifact allows to include much more distributions on the simplex of profiles: simply
by allowing the domain S to include the same individual preference more than once4.
As far as the logic of Section 3 is concerned (condition securing the total elimination
of cycles), another line could be investigated: this is the impact of the assumption that
profiles of preferences contain an irreducible weight of voters with coarse preference. This
can be simply illustrated by the leading example where n = 3. Denote Λ1 = λ1+λ4+λ5,
Λ2 = λ2 + λ3 + λ6 and Λ3 =
133
i=7
λi; one easily gets, as a necessary condition for the cycle
(1, 2, 3) to occur:
1 + Λ1 > µ(1 + Λ2) . (3)
Under the assumption that at least a ratio ν of the voting population exhibits coarse
preferences (which translates in Λ3 ≥ ν ⇐⇒ Λ1 + Λ2 < 1 − ν), then inequality (3)
is impossible if µ ≥ 2 − ν. One of course gets back the result that for dichotomous
preferences (i.e., ν = 1) cycles do not occur under the simple majority rule. But moreover
4In the example at the end of Section 4, where n = 3, S contains 60 preferences: the 6 fine ones and 9
times the 6 dichotomous ones; the Lebesgue measure on the simplex of dimension 60 then projects into
a measure on the usual simplex of dimension 12 with a heavier density on the dichotomous preferences:
35!
12
i=7
λ8i
8!
.
See Balasko and Cre`s (1997) for details.
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if at least half of the voting population exhibits coarse preferences (i.e., ν = 0.5), then
τ = 60% is enough to exclude cycle, instead of 66% in the general case.
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Appendix
Proposition 7 For all q and l such that f ≤ q, then we have
F f−1q (1) ≥ F fq (1) .
19
It is a step toward proving the conjecture since if, for example, F f−1q (1) ≥ F fq (1) , and the two curves do
not cross too early, then F f−1q crosses the value 1 before F
f
q .
Proof: Fix k, 1 ≤ k ≤ f, f < q, and consider the two sets S and S I of sequences of respective specification
(e1, . . . , ef) and (e1, . . . , ek−1, ek − 1, 1, ek+1, . . . , ef), e1 + . . .+ ef = q.
Take a sequence σ of S; it contains ek times the integer k: σ−1(k) = {i1, . . . , iek} is a subset of
{1, . . . , f}. If we replace, in σ, the integer σ(i1) = k by the integer k + 1, and then all the integers kI,
k+1 ≤ kI ≤ f, by their immediate successor kI+1, then we obtain a sequence of S I: denote it σˆi1 . Such
a process associates with each sequence of S ek sequences of S I. We get then a correspondence Γk from
S into S I:
Γk : S −→ S I
σ −→ {σˆi1 , . . . , σˆil}
It is easy to check that all sequences of S I can be constructed from the right sequence of S through this
operation. Recall that 2S I = q!/e1! . . . (ek − 1)! . . . ef! and 2S = q!/e1! . . . ef! which entails 2S I = ek × 2S.
We want to look at the eﬀect of such transformations through Γk on the characteristic functions of
S and S I respectively. We need compare the respective values of ζσ(ι) and ζσˆi1 (ι). To do so, thanks to
lemma (3) we only have to check how Γ changes the properties of σ¯ in terms of rises, falls and levels.
Consider an integer i ∈ σ−1(k), σ being an element of the set BS(r, p; q). There can be nine configu-
rations in terms of rises, falls and levels around σ(i) = k. We only care about those configurations that
are changed by the operation Γk described above. They are:
1. σ(i − 1) → σ(i)(= k) → σ(i + 1) which becomes σˆi(i − 1) ↑ σˆi(i)(= k + 1) ↓ σˆi(i + 1); then
σˆi ∈ BSI(r − 1, t+ 1; q),
2. σ(i− 1)→ σ(i) ↑ σ(i+ 1) which becomes σˆi(i− 1) ↑ σˆi(i) ↑ σˆi(i+ 1); then σˆi ∈ BSI(r − 1, t; q),
3. σ(i− 1)→ σ(i) ↓ σ(i+ 1) which becomes σˆi(i− 1) ↑ σˆi(i) ↓ σˆi(i+ 1); then σˆi ∈ BSI(r − 1, t; q),
4. σ(i− 1) ↑ σ(i)→ σ(i+ 1) which becomes σˆi(i− 1) ↑ σˆi(i) ↓ σˆi(i+ 1); then σˆi ∈ BSI(r, t+ 1; q),
5. σ(i− 1) ↓ σ(i)→ σ(i+ 1) which becomes σˆi(i− 1) ↓ σˆi(i) ↓ σˆi(i+ 1); then σˆi ∈ BSI(r, t+ 1; q),
Denote Sˆi the set S after transformation of the sequence σ as described above. Then we have:
• FSˆi = FS ×
p
(r−1)+(t+1)µ
r+tµ
Q1/2S
in case 1,
• FSˆi = FS ×
p
(r−1)+tµ
r+tµ
Q1/2S
in cases 2 and 3,
• FSˆi = FS ×
p
r+(t+1)µ
r+tµ
Q1/2S
in cases 4 and 5.
It is clear that for µ = 1, case 1 is neutral with respect to the characteristic function. In order to
get the proposition, it is suﬃcient to prove that to each transformation of type 4 or 5 corresponds a
transformation of type 2 or 3. Indeed, the association of a case of type 2 or 3 with a case of type 4 or 5
amounts to multiply the characteristic function FS by
w
(r + tµ)2 + (r + tµ)(µ− 1)− µ
(r + tµ)2
W1/2S
20
which is strictly smaller than 1 for µ = 1. The final argument to get the proposition is that the full
transformation of S through Γk gives ek times S I, which has the same characteristic function as S.
Assume that case 4 arises, i.e., we start from a sequence σ ∈ BS(r, p; q) such that k = σ(i) whose
environment is σ(i− 1) ↑ σ(i)→ σ(i+1). It entails in particular that σ(i+1) = k. Consider the ordered
set {i, i+1, . . . , q, 1, 2, . . . , i− 1}. Reading this set from left to right, pick the first integer (call it j) such
that σ(j) W= k. That such a j exists is obvious, otherwise σ is not a surjection on {1, 2, . . . , f}. We then
know that the environment of k = σ(j) is σ(j − 1) → σ(j) ↓ σ(j + 1) or σ(j − 1) → σ(j) ↑ σ(j + 1)
depending on whether σ(j+1) is smaller or bigger than k, meaning that case 2 or 3 automatically follows
case 4. The same line of reasoning holds if case 5 arises. 2
Proof of proposition (5): We reproduce the preceding proof in the case where ej = 1 for all 1 ≤ j W=
k ≤ q − 1 and ek = 2. For this set, case 1 cannot occur, because an integer appears at most twice in
a sequence. On top of that if σ is a sequence of S included in BS(r, t; q), then necessarily, since there
is at most one level, i.e., we have: t ≤ r ≤ t + 1. Only when r = t + 1 the transformation through Γk
as described in the preceding proof is not neutral with respect to FS : we know that it then amounts to
multiply FS by the quantity w
t(t+ 1)(1 + µ)2
[(t+ 1) + tµ]2
W1/2S
.
Associate to σ ∈ BS(t+1, t; q) the reverse sequence Opp(σ) : σ(n) . . .σ(1). It has also one level and
as many falls as σ has rises, i.e., q − t − 1, so that we have Opp(σ) ∈ BS(q − t − 1, q − t; q). And the
transformation Γk applied to Opp(σ) amounts to multiply FS by the quantity
w
(q − t− 1)(q − t)(1 + µ)2
[(q − t) + (q − t− 1)µ]2
W1/2S
.
If we conjugate the transformations of σ and Opp(σ), we obtain a multiplication by the quantity
[fq(t;µ)]
1/2S , where the function fq is given by:
fq(x;µ) =
x(x+ 1)(q − x− 1)(q − x)(1 + µ)4
[(x+ 1) + xµ]2[(q − x) + (q − x− 1)µ]2 .
It can be easily proved that fq(·;µ) reaches its maximum for x = (q − 1)/2, and that fq((q − 1)/2;µ) is
smaller than 1 when µ ≤
0
1 + 2/(q − 1). Indeed
fq((q − 1)/2;µ) =
X0
(q + 1)(q − 1)(1 + µ)
(q + 1) + (q − 1)µ
~4
,
so that it is smaller than 1 if and only if [
0
(q + 1)(q − 1)− (q−1)]µ ≤ (q+1)−
0
(q + 1)(q − 1) which is
equivalent to
√
q − 1(
√
q + 1−
√
q − 1)µ ≤
√
q + 1(
√
q + 1−
√
q − 1) hence µ ≤

q+1
q−1 =
0
1 + 2/(q − 1).
The proposition holds true, first because the argument can be reproduced for all k, 1 ≤ k ≤ q − 1–
we obtain the whole set Sqq for each k–, and second because for µ = V (q − 1) ≤
0
1 + 2/(q − 1),
FSqq (q;V (q − 1)) = 1 and then FSq−1q (q;V (q − 1)) > 1 which implies µ
q−1
q < µ
q
q = V (q − 1). 2
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